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“Uncomplaining acceptance of the reality of society gives man 
indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injustice and 
unfreedom. As long as he is true to his task of creating more abundant 
freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or planning will turn 
against him and destroy the freedom he is building by their 
instrumentality.”1 
“[M]arket societies must construct elaborate rules and institutional 
structures to limit the individual pursuit of gain or risk degenerating into a 
 
 1. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 268 (2d ed. 2001). 
  
2013] GERMANY’S SUPPORT OF ASSAD 1359 
Hobbesian war of all against all . . . They must also act to channel the 
energies of those economic actors motivated largely by gain into a narrow 
range of legitimate activities. In summary, the economy has to be 
embedded in law, politics, and morality.”2 
The availability of liberation technologies, or information and 
communication technologies utilized by individuals seeking greater 
freedoms and rights, has changed the nature of modern 
democratization movements by facilitating pro-democracy and anti-
democracy efforts alike.3 The revolutionary potential of social media 
has been well documented, as it has played an important role in 
helping to unseat authoritarian leaders throughout the Arab Spring.4 
However, these technologies can also provide the state with 
advanced surveillance capabilities and help governments crush 
democratic movements before they can get off the ground.5 
The extent to which dictators employ repressive surveillance 
techniques varies widely.6 While obtaining reliable news from many 
of these war-torn states is a challenge, press reports indicate that 
dictators such as Bashar al-Assad have used intrusive surveillance 
 
 2. Fred Block & Karl Polanyi, Karl Polanyi and the Writing of “The Great 
Transformation”, 32 THEORY & SOC’Y 275, 297 (2003). 
 3. See Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Liberation vs. Control: The 
Future of Cyberspace, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 43, 44 (2010) (alluding to the ability of 
dictatorships to use liberation technologies to invade the privacy of its citizens by 
tracking and tracing digital information to specific people); Larry Diamond, 
Liberation Technology, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 70 (2010) (“Liberation technology 
is any form of information and communication technology (ICT) that can expand 
political, social, and economic freedom.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Tanja Aitamurto, How Social Media Is Keeping the Egyptian 
Revolution Alive, PBS (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/09/ 
how-social-media-is-keeping-the-egyptian-revolution-alive256.html (highlighting 
the ongoing use of Twitter and Facebook for pro-democracy activism in Post-
Mubarak Egypt); Justin Bomberowitz, The Libyan Revolution Through Social 
Media, BOSTINNO, (Aug. 22, 2011), http://bostinno.com/2011/08/22/the-libyan-
revolution-through-social-media/ (describing the importance of Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube, and blogs in the Libyan revolution). 
 5. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 3, at 71 (comparing authoritarian violence 
accomplished through the Internet to 19th century violence committed through the 
use of the telegraph). 
 6. See generally The Technology Helping Repressive Regimes Spy, NPR (Dec. 
14, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/14/143639670/the-technology-helping-
repressive-regimes-spy (discussing the variety of surveillance techniques 
employed in the Middle East, including text message analysis systems, email and 
cellphone surveillance, and the monitoring of internet traffic). 
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tools to track individuals’ movements, access electronic files, and 
even detain and torture members of the opposition.7 Unfortunately, 
stories of detention and torture, aided by cutting-edge Western 
surveillance technology, are not uncommon.8 Many dictators cannot 
maintain effective surveillance without these Western companies, 
such as Trovicor GmbH (Trovicor), which provides both 
technological infrastructure and maintenance services.9 Not only 
does this type of surveillance allow egregious rights violations to go 
unfettered, it also prolongs bloody conflicts in transitioning states 
like Syria.10 
This comment makes a case for state liability for extraterritorial 
human rights abuses committed by corporations under the framework 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and explains 
that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has already laid 
the foundation to find such a violation. Part II will discuss the current 
status of the ECHR. It will also explain the jurisdictional requirement 
laid out in Article 1 of the ECHR and describe when the ECtHR has 
 
 7. See Monitoring the Opposition: Siemens Allegedly Sold Surveillance Gear 
to Syria, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/ 
business/ard-reports-siemens-sold-surveillance-technology-to-syria-a-826860.html 
[hereinafter Monitoring the Opposition] (describing the Syrian regime’s 
suppression of the opposition through use of surveillance technology, provided by 
the German company Trovicor, that is capable of tracking a speaker’s location and 
identity). 
 8. See, e.g., Meg Roggensack & Betsy Walters, Excuses, Excuses: 
Surveillance Technology and Oppressive Regimes, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST  
(Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/11/18/excuses-excuses-
surveillance-technology-and-oppressive-regimes/ (providing examples of detention 
and torture made possible by Western surveillance technologies in states like Iran, 
Bahrain, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen). 
 9. See generally EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF 
INTERNET FREEDOM 178 (2012) (detailing Western companies’ disregard for 
engaging in proactive measures to limit the human rights abuses that occur through 
the use of their surveillance technologies). 
 10. See Roggensack & Walters, supra note 8 (mentioning that Syria does not 
have laws to limit the Government’s ability to use surveillance technologies, 
allowing these technologies to prop up the repressive regime); cf. Ellen 
Nakashima, Iran Aids Syria in Tracking Opposition via Electronic Surveillance, 
U.S. Officials Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 
2012-10-09/world/35500619_1_surveillance-software-syrians-president-bashar 
(describing how Syria has used surveillance strategies learned from Iran to track 
rebel groups via social media and send Syrian forces to identified areas to hamper 
opposition efforts). 
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asserted its authority outside of the traditional confines of the 
Council of Europe. Furthermore, it will describe how different cases 
have dealt with the positive obligations of states under Article 8, 
which codifies a right to privacy, and when these obligations have 
been enforced. 
Part III will argue that the ECHR provides the ECtHR jurisdiction 
over the extraterritorial effects of a corporation’s actions through the 
state agent theory. And, importantly, it will argue that Germany 
violated its positive obligation to respect the rights in Article 8 of the 
ECHR by failing to regulate the German company Trovicor GmbH 
(Trovicor) after it facilitated the creation of a Syrian surveillance 
state.  
Part IV recommends that a more stringent and binding version of 
the Global Network Initiative be created in order to hold companies 
responsible for failing to uphold clear standards of corporate social 
responsibility. It also recommends that Germany adopt more 
stringent dual-use export control regulations in order to prevent its 
companies from exporting their technology to repressive regimes that 
use the technology to commit human rights violations. Additionally, 
it suggests that the exceptions to the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) be 
expanded to include violations of human rights, so that when states 
like Germany impose stricter regulations on exports, they will not 
violate their WTO duties. Lastly, Part V concludes that Germany can 
be held liable under the ECHR for the actions of Trovicor and that 
the ECtHR should clarify its international precedent on the liability 
of a member state for extraterritorial human rights violations by 
companies. 
II. BACKGROUND 
On September 3, 1953, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), drafted by the Council of Europe, entered into 
force.11 The Council of Europe drafted the ECHR in response to the 
human rights violations of the Second World War.12 With memories 
 
 11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 12. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE xxi, xxii–xxiii (2000) (recounting the evolution of 
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of the Holocaust fresh in the minds of the Council, the drafters of the 
ECHR questioned traditional notions of sovereignty and sought to 
curb the power of states by adopting strong substantive protections of 
rights and granting broad jurisdiction to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), the judicial body that hears complaints 
under the ECHR.13 Like most human rights conventions, the ECHR 
not only requires states to refrain from committing violations, but 
also imposes positive obligations requiring a state to take affirmative 
steps to protect and promote the rights codified in the ECHR.14 
In fact, many have praised the European system for achieving the 
most effective protection of human rights, as compared to the 
protection provided by other regional systems of human rights.15 
Despite the ECHR’s effectiveness, however, concerns of a 
governance gap, caused by globalization and the inability to control 
corporate activities, remain.16 Minimizing governance gaps is an 
extremely important task for human rights advocates because these 
gaps pose some of the most serious risks to human rights.17 
 
international human rights after the Nuremberg trials and explaining how 
instruments like the European Convention were the first major regional response). 
 13. See generally id. (discussing the historical basis for the creation and 
development of case law for the European Court of Human Rights). 
 14. See Tawhida Ahmed & Israel de Jesus Butler, The European Union and 
Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 771, 771–75 
(2006) (providing that the European Union (EU) member states may be bound by 
customary international law to protect certain human rights, thereby challenging 
traditional notions of community and sovereignty by subjecting those states to 
positive obligations and providing a place for international law to help guide 
domestic decision-making). 
 15. See Carole J. Petersen, Bridging the Gap?: The Role of Regional and 
National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y 
J. 174, 184–86 (2011) (highlighting that the ECHR not only has placed strict 
responsibilities on states that are party to the Convention, but also has served as a 
model internationally for the promotion of various human rights, including the 
right to a private life). 
 16. See EUROPEAN COALITION FOR CORPORATE JUSTICE & AMNESTY INT’L, 
GREEN PAPER ON THE REVIEW OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 44/2001 ON 
JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL MATTERS 3 (2009) [hereinafter ECCJ & AI], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society
_ngo_academics_others/amnesty_international_and_european_coalition_for_corpo
rate_justice_en.pdf (defining governance gaps as failures in legal mechanisms to 
deter human rights abuses from occurring through the creation of liability for 
entities such as corporations). 
 17. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2010: A GLOBAL RISK 
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A. ARTICLE 1 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
Article 1 of the ECHR states that contracting parties to the 
ECHR—states that comprise the Council of Europe—are responsible 
for guaranteeing the rights defined by the ECHR to any person 
within the jurisdiction of the respective states.18 The term “within 
their jurisdiction” has been the subject of much jurisprudential 
interpretation as applicants have advocated for an expansion of the 
ECHR’s protection beyond the territorial confines of the member 
states.19 A major impetus for these new interpretations is the 
ECtHR’s willingness to move away from the “ultimate control and 
authority test” to determine jurisdiction towards the much laxer 
“effective authority and control test,” which has resulted in more 
findings of jurisdiction.20 Thus, the concept of jurisdiction has 
expanded substantially, making way for the Court to apply an 
extraterritorial interpretation.21  
 
NETWORK REPORT 8 (2010), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/ 
WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2010.pdf (indicating that governance gaps are so 
uniquely dangerous because the growing interconnectedness of our globalized 
world provides more space for gaps to appear). 
 18. See ECHR, supra note 11, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties shall 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention.”). 
 19. See Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human 
Rights Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
227, 238-51 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (documenting the ECtHR’s cases that have 
interpreted Article 1 of the Convention, and noting that the European Commission 
of Human Rights has stipulated that “within their jurisdiction” can apply to agents 
of the State including diplomatic or consular agents, the military, and persons or 
property over which these actors exercise authority). 
 20. See Laura Henderson, Note, With (Great) Power Comes (Great) 
Responsibility: A Move Toward Greater Responsibility for States Exercising 
Power Abroad, 28 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 50, 54 (2012) (observing that the 
Court in Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom moved away from the ultimate authority and 
control test, thereby allowing more responsibility to be attributed to the 
extraterritorial actions of member states by accepting a lower threshold for 
control). 
 21. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
18 ¶¶ 149–50 (2011) (finding that the actions of United Kingdom (UK) troops in 
Basra, Iraq, fell within the UK’s jurisdiction for purposes of Article 1 of the 
ECHR); see also Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights 
Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 262, 294-95, 
300 (2008) (describing the basis for civil and criminal accountability for the 
extraterritorial actions of corporations in the European context as a means to 
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Initially, in Bankovic v. Belgium (2001), the ECtHR limited the 
scope of Article 1 by using a fact-specific inquiry to analyze 
extraterritorial positive obligations, and by holding that, for a 
positive obligation to exist, the foreign state in question should have 
existed previously under the territorial confines of the ECHR.22 The 
Bankovic Court, therefore, appeared to seriously diminish the 
possibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction.23 After this decision, the 
international community generally understood that Article 1 of the 
ECHR was essentially or primarily territorial in its application, only 
circumventable in exceptional circumstances.24 
The ECtHR has recently reversed this trend, however, and 
affirmed a broader interpretation of Article 1 jurisdiction.25 In Al-
Skeini v. the United Kingdom (2011), the Court formally listed the 
exceptions to the “essentially territorial” application of Article 1, 
when it held the United Kingdom responsible for the actions of its 
troops in Iraq.26 First, the spatial model allows for jurisdiction when a 
Convention state exercises effective control, through initiating 
military action, over an area.27 Second, the personal model allows for 
jurisdiction through the actions taken abroad by an agent of a state 
that is a party to the ECHR.28 This can include the actions of a 
 
ensure that corporations pay a penalty for violating human rights and victims 
receive reparations). 
 22. See Alexandra Ruth & Mirja Trilsch, International Decision: Bankovic v. 
Belgium (Admissibility), 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 168, 170–72 (2003) (describing how 
the ECtHR seemed to narrow the holdings in Loizidou v. Turkey and Cyprus v. 
Turkey when it found that NATO bombings in Kosovo were not within the 
jurisdiction of Article 1). 
 23. See id. at 172 (highlighting that the Bankovic decision marked a drastic 
switch from the Court’s previous decisions which seemed to expand the notion of 
jurisdiction beyond mere territoriality). 
 24. See Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 ¶ 80 (establishing 
jurisdiction “only when the territory in question was one that, but for the specific 
circumstances, would normally be covered by the Convention”). 
 25. See Paolo Ronchi, Al-Skeini v. UK: The Borders of Human Rights, L.Q. 
REV. (forthcoming) (explaining the recent expansion of the territorial notions in 
Article 1, but also conveying the lack of clarity provided by the Court on this 
issue). 
 26. See Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 ¶¶ 149–50 (utilizing a hybrid test to 
hold that the United Kingdom was responsible for the actions of its troops abroad 
because the UK exercised effective control over Iraq as an occupying power and 
its troops fulfilled the public power function by providing a security role). 
 27. Id. ¶ 138; Ronchi, supra note 25, at 3. 
 28. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 ¶¶ 133–36; see Cedric Ryngaert, Clarifying 
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diplomatic or consular agent in a foreign territory, any agent that 
exercises an executive or judicial public power function in a foreign 
territory, or a state agent that takes custody of an individual in a 
foreign territory.29 As a result, the ECHR has gradually extended its 
territorial scope, opening the door for more cases to be brought 
before the ECtHR to test the limits of the formal exceptions to 
territorial jurisdiction.30  
B. POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
Article 8 of the ECHR is widely recognized as establishing an 
individual’s right to a private life.31 As compared to other 
international instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the ECHR places a higher burden 
upon member states by requiring them to respect the right to 
privacy.32  
The ECHR, of which Germany is a party, provides a robust basis 
for imposing a positive obligation on states to protect an individual’s 
 
the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, 28 
UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 57, 60 (2011) (identifying the personal model of 
jurisdiction and the lack of explanation provided by the ECtHR on its meaning). 
 29. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 ¶¶ 134–36; cf. Ryngaert, supra note 26, at 
60 (suggesting that positive obligations can and should extend through state agents 
because states need to be deterred from engaging in irresponsible behavior beyond 
their borders). 
 30. See Tarik Abdel-Monem, The Long Arm of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Recent Development of Issa v. Turkey, 12 AM. U. HUM. 
RTS. BRIEF 9, 11 (highlighting Russia as a likely candidate to be brought before the 
ECtHR for extraterritorial violations); Ronchi, supra note 25, at 4 (indicating that 
the Court has failed to elaborate on the State agent exception despite the potential 
importance of the exception). 
 31. Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in 
Human Rights Treaties, 6 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 247, 248 (1998). 
 32. See ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8(1) (“Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private . . . life.”); ALASTAIR MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (2004) (explaining that members of the 
European Convention on Human Rights must take positive actions to prevent 
violations of the convention even when a violation occurs between two private 
parties); id. at 250–59 (comparing the ICCPR’s text to that of the ECHR and 
noting that while the ECHR has broad protections it has not fully developed its 
data protection laws). 
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right to privacy.33 Although a negative obligation exists when a third 
party acts on behalf of a state, the ECHR also imposes a positive 
obligation when a third party acts independent of the state.34 This 
authority derives from the requirement of states to respect the right to 
privacy and allows the ECtHR to hold a state liable for failing to take 
reasonable measures to prevent a third party from violating the rights 
codified in the ECHR.35 As seen in Fadeyeva v. Russia (2005), the 
Court has most thoroughly developed the concept of positive 
obligations to control the actions of corporate entities in the case of 
environmental polluters, finding that governments have the 
responsibility to prevent corporations from diminishing an 
individual’s right to enjoy his or her private life when private 
 
 33. Germany, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://hub.coe.int/country/germany (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2013) (noting that Germany ratified the ECHR on December 5, 
1952; see MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 1–3 (contextualizing the development of 
positive obligations in the European Court and recapping some of the earliest 
discussions of them). Compare ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8(2) (prohibiting 
violations of the right to privacy except “in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others”), with U.N. Human Rights Commission, 
CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to 
Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of 
Honour and Reputation (Art. 17), ¶¶ 3–4 (Aug. 4, 1988), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/23378a8724595410c12563ed004aee
cd?Opendocument (explaining that violations of the right to privacy, include 
arbitrary or unlawful searches, which are unreasonable given the circumstances, 
such as when public authorities fail to justify the data mining of personal 
information of an individual). 
 34. See DANIEL AUGENSTEIN, STATE RESPONSIBILITIES TO REGULATE AND 
ADJUDICATE CORPORATE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2011) (delineating between negative obligations, which enforce 
non-interference with rights by a state, and positive obligations, which require a 
state to respect and actively prevent third parties, like corporations, from violating 
the rights created by the ECHR). 
 35. See ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8(1) (stating that everyone has the right to 
respect of their private life); STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 215 (2006) 
(discussing the proactive requirement that states take reasonable positive measures 
to prevent violations of the Convention from taking place before they occur, even 
when committed by private parties); MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 186, 225 
(summarizing the extra requirements placed on a state through positive obligations, 
including the duty of states to protect individuals from having their rights in the 
ECHR violated by private persons). 
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corporations cause severe deterioration of the natural environment.36  
In these circumstances, the ECtHR has found a positive obligation 
is established when a sufficient nexus exists between the harm 
caused and the state.37 The ECtHR often accounts for deference 
provided to the judgment of the state, also known as the state’s 
margin of appreciation, by looking to whether the state has taken 
effective and reasonable measures to prevent prohibited behavior.38 
The ECtHR has held, however, that a state’s knowledge of the 
frequent violation of human rights, coupled with the state’s failure to 
act reasonably, can severely diminish the margin of appreciation 
afforded to the state.39 Then, as offered in Fadeyeva, the ECtHR 
provides an extensive analysis using the so-called fair balance test, 
weighing the rights of an individual against the interests of society to 
determine whether a state fulfills its positive obligation.40 Thus, the 
 
 36. See Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 92 (holding Russia 
accountable for the pollution emanating from a steel plant); Guerra v. Italy, App. 
No. 14967/89, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210 ¶¶ 56–60 (placing a positive obligation on 
Italy to prevent pollution from a factory); López-Ostra v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 58 (1994) (affirming that Spain had a duty to prevent pollution 
from a waste treatment plant). 
 37. See Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 92 (determining that a 
sufficient nexus existed between Russia and the steel plant’s pollution which 
prevented citizens from enjoying their private lives). 
 38. See Janneke Gerards, Pluralism, Deference, and the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine, 17 EUR. L.J. 80, 85-87 (2010) (comparing the margin of 
appreciation doctrine to deferential judicial review and recognizing the strong 
similarity between the two). See generally Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin of 
Appreciation?, 3 U.C. LONDON HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 2–5 (2010) (tracing the 
introduction and development of the margin of appreciation doctrine within the 
ECtHR and underscoring its wide applicability today). 
 39. Compare X & Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 24–27 (1985) 
(determining that the Netherlands was not afforded a margin of appreciation for 
failing to criminalize certain illegal acts that violated the right to private life), with 
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49 (1976) (providing 
the first application of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the ECtHR when it 
determined that the United Kingdom’s restrictions on speech were reasonable 
because they served the Council of Europe’s goal of promoting a democratic 
society). 
 40. Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 94; see MOWBRAY, supra note 32, 
at 186 (detailing the use of the fair balance test in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence). But 
see ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8(2) (identifying the legitimate interests of society 
for which an Article 8 right can be interfered with, such as national security, public 
safety, economic well-being, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health 
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ECtHR has afforded great protection to the rights established in the 
ECHR, such as the right to a private life, by both imposing positive 
obligations on states and scrutinizing the validity of each state’s 
actions.41 
III. ANALYSIS 
Unlike other authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, Bashar al-
Assad has promoted the use of social media in Syria to help a group 
of pro-Assad hackers intercept communications and track the 
movements of the Syrian opposition.42 While these pro-government 
hackers are arguably drivers for many human rights violations in 
Syria, Germany’s complicity in Syria’s spying tactics violates the 
ECHR’s guarantee of privacy, even though Syria is outside of the 
territorial confines of the Council of Europe.43 Moreover, the severity 
with which Syria is violating the right to privacy and its utter 
disregard for its international obligations helps contextualize the 
second part of this analysis, i.e., Germany’s responsibility for 
Trovicor’s actions.44  
A. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAS JURISDICTION 
OVER TROVICOR’S ACTIONS IN SYRIA UNDER THE STATE AGENT 
THEORY OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE GERMANY EXERCISES 
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER TROVICOR 
Through utilization of Trovicor’s technologies, Syria’s 
surveillance capabilities extend beyond mere interception of 
communications and tracking of citizens’ locations.45 Because 
 
or morals, or for protection of other rights and freedoms). 
 41. See generally MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 1–5 (portraying the important 
role positive obligations have played in European jurisprudence). 
 42. See Ben Knight, German Spyware Business Supports Dictators, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,16249165,00.html 
(pointing out Syria’s inclination to use digital weapons against the opposition). 
 43. See id. (detailing the sale of malware by German companies to Syria, along 
with technology that has the ability to “identify political opponents” according to 
one of the company’s brochures). 
 44. See id. (indicating that the spying has been so severe in Syria, that the EU 
has realized the increased need to create new export controls for these surveillance 
technologies). 
 45. See Vernon Silver & Ben Elgin, Torture in Bahrain Becomes Routine with 
Help From Nokia Siemens, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-22/torture-in-bahrain-becomes-routine-
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Trovicor functions as a state agent of Germany, the ECtHR has 
jurisdiction to hear a complaint related to Trovicor’s activities in 
Syria.46 These activities constitute violations of Article 8 of the 
ECHR both because they arbitrarily interfere with individuals’ 
private lives and private correspondence, and because they indicate 
that Trovicor’s services fulfill a public power function in Syria.47  
1. Trovicor Is a State Agent Because Trovicor’s Actions Are 
Attributable to Germany 
To consider Trovicor a state agent for purposes of ECHR liability, 
its actions must be attributable to Germany.48 Attribution is 
determined by which state has effective control over the violating 
entity, based on factors such as whether there is an explicit, legal 
duty upon the state to have some degree of responsibility for the 
entity’s actions and whether the entity recognizes that the state has 
 
with-help-from-nokia-siemens-networking.html (explaining that Trovicor allows 
states to intercept nearly all forms of digital transmissions, track individuals’ 
locations through their phones, activate laptop applications without the user’s 
knowledge, and even alter the content of digital communications). 
 46. See Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶ 81 (ordering that if a 
Council of Europe member state has jurisdiction over a private individual, then 
that member state has a duty to prevent that individual from violating another 
individual’s Convention-protected rights, even while in a foreign area); Company 
Overview of Trovicor GmbH, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing. 
businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=81677726 (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2013) (explaining that Trovicor is based in Munich, Germany); see 
also Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, ¶ 6, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/17/31, Annexes 24–25 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights](arguing that the need for a judicial and 
non-judicial remedy to the governance issue of controlling the actions of 
multinational companies might necessitate such an expansive understanding of 
jurisdiction in regional human rights instruments). 
 47. See, e.g., Christian Fuchs, Implications of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 
Internet Surveillance for Society, in THE PRIVACY & SECURITIES – RESEARCH 
PAPER SERIES 1, 32 (2012) (putting into perspective the intrusiveness of Trovicor’s 
surveillance technologies, like deep packet inspection, which involves a complete 
scan of all data and extraction of any relevant information). 
 48. See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 85 
(2011) (holding that in the case of unlawful detention in Iraq by British armed 
forces, the United Kingdom could be held liable through Article 1 if the violation 
of Article 8 could be attributed to the UK). 
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authority over it.49 The determining fact for jurisdictional purposes is 
whether Germany had the ability to regulate Trovicor at the time that 
Trovicor entered Syria.50 
Trovicor, as a German-regulated company, is subject to 
Germany’s control and authority both while operating in Germany 
and in regards to its business practices abroad.51 Trovicor is 
headquartered in Munich, Germany, and is a member of BITKOM, 
an organization that actively engages in lobbying efforts to change 
German policies, indicating that Trovicor recognizes its operations 
are subject to German regulation while in Germany.52 Also, given 
 
 49. See Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace 
Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 509, 
522–23 (2008) (discussing the Court’s decision in Behrami, where it found that the 
United Nations had ultimate authority and control, a more difficult standard than 
what is required today). Compare Cyprus, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶ 81 
(conveying that when a state has control over a private party and acquiesces to that 
party’s violation of ECHR in a foreign territory, then Article 1 jurisdiction can 
apply), with id. ¶ 82 (finding that the United Nations’ official policy against 
indefinite internment indicated that its attempts to punish the unlawful detention 
proved the detention was not attributable to the UN). See generally Anne Peters, 
The Applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights in Times of 
Complex Jurisdiction and the Principle of Fundamental Rights Tolerance, 48 
ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 1, 19–41 (2010) (identifying the tension between 
state autonomy and the effective promotion of human rights as a central concern 
when applying the attribution theory for jurisdictional questions, thus giving rise to 
the notion of ultimate control). 
 50. See Cyprus, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶¶ 2–6 (Faud, J., partly dissenting) 
(noting the importance of the fact in Loizidou v. Turkey that Turkey had control 
over the TRNC at the time that the organization entered Turkey to establish Article 
1 jurisdiction because Turkey was a significant cause of the Convention being 
violated); AUGENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 24 (creating a distinction between ‘direct 
extraterritorial jurisdiction’ and ‘domestic measures with extraterritorial 
implications’ and stressing that it is easier to find ECHR jurisdiction in the latter-
type cases). 
 51. See SIEMENS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011: CREATING SUSTAINABLE CITIES  
29 (2011) [hereinafter SIEMENS ANNUAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.siemens.com/investor/pool/en/investor_relations/siemens_ar_2011.pdf 
(observing that Siemens AG, of which Trovicor is a subsidiary, is regulated by 
numerous pieces of German legislation, including the German Stock Corporation 
Act, the German Corporate Governance Code, and the German Codetermination 
Act). 
 52. See About BITKOM, BITKOM, http://www.bitkom.org/en/about_bitkom/ 
42620.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (outlining the organization’s goals to 
promote strategic ICT-Policy within Germany to benefit its member companies); 
Trovicor in Brief, TROVICOR, http://trovicor.com/en/company-en.html (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2013). 
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that Trovicor has provided similarly improper surveillance to 
Bahrain, Germany could have active knowledge of Trovicor’s 
actions, thereby creating an explicit duty for Germany to improve 
regulations targeting Trovicor.53 Even though the European Union 
(EU) also maintains the ability to create export controls to regulate 
companies like Trovicor, the ECtHR has recognized that a state has 
effective control if an international organization allows the state to 
exercise comparatively more control over an entity.54 In this instance, 
Germany specifically regulates the dual-use export market and has 
even more restrictive regulations than the EU regarding these items, 
demonstrating that Germany exercises comparatively more control 
over Trovicor than any other state or international entity.55 
While Germany arguably did not hold as much control over 
Trovicor when Trovicor began executing its maintenance and service 
contracts in Syria, Germany’s control over Trovicor before it entered 
Syria sufficiently satisfies the effective control test.56 As previously 
established, Trovicor is subject to German regulations.57 The ECtHR 
has already determined that if a state is responsible for an entity’s 
entry into a foreign territory, the Court has jurisdiction over the state 
for failure to uphold a positive obligation by controlling the actions 
 
 53. See Kim Zetter, Nokia-Siemens Spy Tools Aid Police Torture in Bahrain, 
WIRED (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/nokia-
siemens-spy-systems/ (documenting Trovicor’s involvement in twelve Middle 
Eastern and North African states and comparing the similarities between 
surveillance provided by Trovicor and weapons technologies). 
 54. Cf. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 83–
86 (2011) (determining that the United Kingdom had effective control over its 
troops who had unlawfully detained an individual, sufficient for jurisdiction, even 
though the United Nations Security Council authorized the mission in Iraq, 
because the ECtHR found that the UK had ultimate control over the troops’ 
actions). 
 55. See ISABELLE MAELCAMP, US COMMERCIAL SERV., EU EXPORT CONTROL 
ON DUAL USE ITEMS 4 (2010) (acknowledging that Germany places more 
restrictive regulations on dual-use exports by supplementing the EU’s list of “most 
sensitive items” with its own list, and that this type of national list is expressly 
encouraged by Article 4 of the EU Council Regulation 428/2009). 
 56. See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89,310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
¶ 56 (1996) (affirming the principle that even though Turkey did not exercise 
direct control of TRNC forces after they entered northern Cyprus, the fact that 
Turkey had effective overall control of those troops was sufficient for a finding of 
jurisdiction). 
 57. See SIEMENS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 25 (detailing which pieces 
of German legislation apply to Trovicor). 
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of that entity.58 Thus, Germany’s effective authority and control over 
Trovicor allows the ECtHR to uphold Germany’s jurisdiction over 
Trovicor as a state agent, if Trovicor’s actions meet the public 
powers requirements of jurisdiction.  
2. Trovicor’s Actions Fulfill the Public Powers Requirement Because 
Its Surveillance Technology Acts as a Supplement to Law 
Enforcement, a Traditionally Judicial Function  
One means by which the state agent jurisdictional exception 
applies is when the foreign state allows the agent to operate within its 
territory, by granting consent, extending an invitation, or 
demonstrating acquiescence.59 Additionally, the agent of a member 
state, while operating in a foreign territory, must take on what is 
typically considered a public powers role within that territory, which 
consists of a major executive or judicial function.60 
Trovicor’s contract with Syria fulfills the invitation requirement 
under this exception.61 A shroud of secrecy surrounds the situation, 
making it difficult to know the exact circumstances; however, reports 
indicate that Trovicor has signed a contract with Syria.62 If similar to 
 
 58. See, Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 51–54 (distinguishing between 
effective control over an area as a grounds for jurisdiction and effective control 
over an entity within a foreign jurisdiction as a basis to impute ECHR liability on 
the contracting state responsible for that entity’s actions). 
 59. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 ¶ 
135 (2011). 
 60. Id.; Ronchi, supra note 25, at 4-5 (recognizing that the ECtHR has failed to 
develop the concept of what constitutes “public powers,” but also mentioning that 
the ECtHR found the UK’s security role in Iraq to fulfill the public powers 
exception). 
 61. See German Firm Sold Surveillance Equipment to Syria, WORLD TRIBUNE 
(Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.worldtribune.com/2012/04/15/german-firm-sold-
surveillance-equipment-to-syria/ (detailing the relationship between Germany and 
Syria in terms of arms supplies and Trovicor’s contract with Assad). 
 62. See Monitoring the Opposition, supra note 7 (referring to a report by public 
broadcaster ARD, which states that Trovicor’s parent businesses signed a contract 
with a state-owned Syrian telecommunications company, STE); Andre Master, 
Siemens and Syria: What Surveillance Technology Can, NETZPOLITIK, (Apr.  
11, 2012, 1:26 PM), https://netzpolitik.org/2012/siemens-und-syrien-was-die-
uberwachungstechnik-kann/ (claiming that the initial contract signed between 
Siemens and Syria, which was eventually transferred to Trovicor, was designed to 
serve a law enforcement purpose); Vernon Silver, Merchants of Surveillance, 
TREASURY & RISK (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/2011/ 
12/22/merchants-of-surveillance (reporting that Trovicor’s marketing director, 
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other contracts negotiated by Trovicor, this contract likely contained 
both sale and maintenance provisions.63 Agreements of this kind, 
which allow one state’s agents to operate in another state, have been 
used to meet the ECtHR’s invitation requirement in the past.64  
Moreover, Trovicor’s provision of law enforcement surveillance 
technologies and maintenance services signal that Trovicor fulfilled a 
public powers role within Syria.65 The ECtHR most recently used a 
hybrid test that linked the state agent and effective control exceptions 
together, finding that attempts to secure the public order are a necessary 
part of the public power function because they help the rest of a 
government to function.66 On the other hand, less necessary functions 
like providing supplemental education services are not considered 
enough to fulfill this exception.67 Even though many in the international 
community recognize Assad’s attempts to violently suppress a 
legitimate opposition, Assad has continuously claimed that surveillance 
measures are necessary to stop the terrorist actions of opposing forces, 
invoking concerns about national security and public order.68 Therefore, 
 
Fischer-Harrow, refuses to release more information related to its contracts). 
 63. See Vernon Silver & Ben Elgin, Torture in Bahrain Becomes Routine With 
Help From Nokia Siemens, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-22/torture-in-bahrain-becomes-routine-
with-help-from-nokia-siemens-networking.html (documenting that Trovicor signed 
a service and maintenance contract with Bahrain). 
 64. See, e.g., Gentilhomme v. France, App. Nos. 48205/99, 48207/99 and 
48209/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002) (describing that the ECtHR found jurisdiction 
when the Algerian Government signed an agreement allowing a French agency to 
operate schools on Algerian territory). 
 65. See Trovicor in Brief, TROVICOR, http://trovicor.com/en/company-en.html 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (explaining that Trovicor provides monitoring and 
intelligence services that are used for the purposes of enhancing the work of law 
enforcement). 
 66. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
18 ¶¶ 144–49 (2011) (determining that the UK fulfilled the public powers 
exception when the Coalitional Provisional Authority declared that the British 
military would provide for security and administration of Iraq, therefore the Court 
found the UK’s control over its troops to be a controlling fact). 
 67. See Gentilhomme, Eur. Ct. H.R. (holding that the Article 8 evidence was 
inadmissible). 
 68. See Alan Cowell, Syria Orders More Airstrikes and Calls French 
Recognition of Rebels ‘Immoral’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/middleeast/syria-war-developments. 
html?pagewanted=all (pointing out that, at the time that this article was written, the 
six Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and France had gone as far as 
recognizing the Syrian opposition coalition as the legitimate government of Syria, 
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the security function of Trovicor’s surveillance technology, by helping 
to control the population, indicates its use for a public powers function.  
Alternatively, in certain instances, under the personal model of 
jurisdiction, the ECtHR has ruled that the relationship between the state 
and the private party determines jurisdiction rather than the relationship 
between the state and the foreign territory.69 The ECtHR imposes 
liability if the state is in a position to change the behavior of the private 
party.70 Thus, the ECtHR may hold Germany liable because it has 
domestic control over Trovicor and a result of failing to effectively 
regulate the company is that Trovicor operates unlawfully within 
Syria.71 Consequently, not only is Trovicor likely considered a state 
agent that serves the public power function of providing law 
enforcement and national security support in Syria, but other innovative 
legal tests can also be applied by the Court to find jurisdiction.  
B. GERMANY IS REQUIRED TO PREVENT TROVICOR FROM 
COMMITTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ABROAD BECAUSE THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS CREATES A POSITIVE 
OBLIGATION 
Germany’s positive obligation to protect the rights guaranteed by 
the ECHR requires it to control the activities of Trovicor because a 
 
while the United States saw it as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people 
but had not officially recognized it as the government in exile); see, e.g., Syrian 
President Tells Envoy Support of ‘Terrorists’ Must Stop, CNN (Oct. 21, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/21/world/meast/syria-brahimi-assad-meeting/index. 
html (recounting Assad’s plea to a UN-Arab League envoy for countries to stop 
providing arms and other support to the rebel terrorists within his country). But see 
Mohammed Abbas & Alessandra Prentice, UK Needs More Details Before Any 
Recognition of Syria Opposition, REUTERS, Nov. 16, 2012, available  
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/16/us-syria-crisis-opposition-britain-id 
USBRE8AF0G220121116 (indicating that, at the time this article was written, the 
UK had delayed official recognition of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, which was 
formed in November 2012 in Doha, until more information about the group could 
be gathered). 
 69. See, e.g., Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 ¶ 71 
(2004) (focusing on the level of authority and control a state exercised through its 
agents operating in another state). 
 70. See id. (stressing that a state with control over one of its agents operating 
abroad may be held accountable for violations of the ECHR committed by that 
agent). 
 71. See id. (recognizing that liability can be incurred whether or not the state’s 
agent is operating in the foreign territory lawfully or unlawfully). 
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sufficient nexus exists between Germany and the human rights 
abuses in Syria.72 Thus far, despite these violations of human rights 
in Syria, Germany has failed to take reasonable measures to prevent 
Trovicor’s complicity in the invasion of privacy rights, thereby 
violating its responsibilities under the ECHR.73 
1. Germany Has a Positive Obligation Under Article 8 to Prevent 
Trovicor from Selling Surveillance Technologies to Syria Because a 
Sufficient Nexus Exists Between Germany and the Violations of 
Privacy 
If there is a sufficient nexus between Germany and the 
surveillance occurring in Syria, Article 8 of the ECHR indicates that 
Germany has a positive obligation to take reasonable measures to 
prevent Trovicor from committing human rights abuses.74 This nexus 
helps identify whether Germany could have reasonably been 
expected to take measures to stop the invasions of privacy of Syrian 
citizens.75 The complex issue of whether a nexus exists, thereby 
 
 72. See Monitoring the Opposition, supra note 7 (underscoring the link 
between Germany’s failed regulatory efforts and Syria’s use of torture against 
those members of the opposition it identifies using Trovicor’s technology). 
 73. Cf. Cindy Cohn & Jillian C. York, “Know Your Customer” Standards for 
Sales of Surveillance Equipment, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/it’s-time-know-your-customer-standards-
sales-surveillance-equipment (providing an example of a reasonable measure to 
prevent export of sensitive dual-use technologies to repressive regimes that calls 
for a company to avoid selling their products to customers who, following a 
reasonable investigation to reveal evidence or raise concerns, the company thinks 
will use those products to violate human rights). 
 74. See AUGENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 6 (observing that under the ‘protect, 
respect, and remedy’ framework, when a corporation is close to or owned by a 
state, or the corporation acts as an agent of the state, the state is liable for the 
wrongful foreign acts of the corporation); see also Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 
28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 41–44 (2000) (upholding a violation of Article 8 when 
private information is subject to secret surveillance by a government and 
determining that the Romanian Government failed to take measures to provide 
effective safeguards against the Romanian Intelligence Services’ ability to retrieve 
this information). 
 75. See, e.g., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 
46, Annexes 6–7 (suggesting that the legal relationship, when the actions of a 
corporation are attributable to a state, can determine whether the state is expected 
to act and whether there was a breakdown in governance); cf. Fadeyeva v. Russia, 
2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶¶ 89–92 (2005) (recounting when the ECtHR 
determined that Russia was expected to take reasonable measures to prevent 
environmental pollution by a steel plant that had previously been owned by the 
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creating a duty to prevent the actions of the corporation, necessitates 
that the ECtHR look to certain factors, such as Germany’s control 
over Trovicor, Germany’s actual or constructive knowledge of 
Trovicor’s activities, and Trovicor’s level of responsibility for 
Syria’s human rights violations.76  
Although Trovicor is not owned or operated by Germany, the facts 
that it is headquartered in Munich and that the German Bundestag 
regulates it indicate that Germany does exercise significant control 
over the company.77 Trovicor was established in 2009 and was 
founded as a subsidiary of Siemens, a company incorporated in 
Germany and subject to German regulation.78 Siemens began selling 
surveillance technologies to Syria in 2000 and this practice continued 
once Trovicor was officially established.79 Furthermore, not only 
does Germany have the ability to regulate the data protection 
industry, it actively does so through regulations of the exportation of 
dual-use surveillance technologies.80 Similar to Fadeyeva, where 
Russia was held liable for a Russian regulated steel plant’s violations 
of Article 8, Germany has enough control over Trovicor to imply a 
 
state and over which Russia continued to exercise control). 
 76. See Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶¶ 89–90 (concentrating on 
issues of the control Russia had over a steel factory and the responsibility it bore in 
environmental cases); Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
210 ¶¶ 57–60 (1998) (concentrating on the knowledge, possessed by the 
government, of the dangers a town faced from factory emissions that the 
government did not pass on to the affected population). 
 77. See Trovicor in Brief, supra note 65 (evidencing that Trovicor’s website 
lists the location of its headquarters as Munich); cf. Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, supra note 46, Annex 7 (proposing that an effective way to 
remedy the governance gap when a corporation is headquartered in a specific state 
is to place responsibility on the state to guarantee that the corporation respects 
human rights abroad). 
 78. SIEMENS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 51, at 25 (listing which acts of 
the German Bundestag regulate Siemens AG, the parent corporation of Trovicor); 
Company Overview of Trovicor GmbH, supra note 46. 
 79. See Monitoring the Opposition, supra note 7 (describing how the spin-off 
company, Trovicor, took over the Voice and Data Recording unit of Nokia 
Siemens). 
 80. See Legislation (Non-Official Translations), FED. OFFICE OF ECON. & EXP. 
CONTROL, http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/legislation/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2013) (providing links to each of the six major pieces of legislation 
passed by the Bundestag on the subject of export controls); Knight, supra note 42 
(referencing new initiatives being put forth by the Left Party and Green Party in 
Germany to crack down on exportation of dual-use software to totalitarian states). 
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positive duty by Germany to take reasonable measures to prevent the 
human rights violations.81 
Furthermore, Germany’s awareness of Trovicor’s human rights 
violations reveals that a sufficient nexus exists between Germany 
and the intrusions into the privacy of Syrian citizens, indicating that 
Germany not only had constructive knowledge, but also actual 
knowledge of Trovicor’s activities.82 Trovicor, through Siemens, has 
been selling technology to Syria since 2000.83 A member of the 
German Bundestag has even spoken out against the original contract 
signed with Syria, evidencing actual knowledge within the German 
government of the situation in Syria.84 Furthermore, these human 
rights violations are not just limited to Syria: Trovicor sold similar 
surveillance technologies to other authoritarian regimes, including 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia.85 This pattern of sales by Trovicor 
signals that Germany has, at the very least, constructive knowledge 
of Trovicor’s actions, especially as compared to other instances 
where the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 through constructive 
and actual knowledge.86  
 
 81. See Fadeyeva, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 91 (holding Russia responsible 
for the environmental violations of private life by the Severstal steel plant because 
Russia exercised control over the plant but failed to prevent or reduce the pollution 
that it produced); see also Guerra, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210 ¶¶ 57, 60 (holding 
Italy responsible for failing to control the activities of a factory that allowed waste 
to pollute the Manfredonia area, because the government possessed knowledge of 
the danger posed by pollution from the plant, but never acted to protect the people 
of Manfredonia or inform them of the danger). 
 82. See Knight, supra note 42 (reporting that German media had previously 
revealed the role of companies like Trovicor in the sale of malware to Syria). 
 83. Monitoring the Opposition, supra note 7. 
 84. See Mit Thomas Kausch, Syria Monitors with Siemens Technology, FAKT 
(Apr. 10, 2012, 9:45 PM), http://www.mdr.de/fakt/siemens106.html (indicating 
that Hans-Christian Ströbele declared that the German firms that sold surveillance 
technology to the Syrian regime, known for torturing regime opponents, were 
complicit in the regime’s crimes). 
 85. See Trevor Timm, Spy Tech Companies & Their Authoritarian Customers, 
Part II: Trovicor and Area SpA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 21, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/02/spy-tech-companies-their-authoritarian-
customers-part-ii-trovicor-and-area-spa (showing that even after another German 
entity, Perusa Partners Fund, purchased Trovicor, the company has continued to 
help dictators in the Middle East and North Africa crack down on their citizens). 
 86. See, e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ¶ 296 (2002) (finding 
a violation of Article 8 because Turkey knew the private lives of Greek Cypriots 
were being harmed and failed to alter its policy toward Cyprus). 
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Germany’s knowledge of the situation is made even more apparent 
given the reactions of the EU and Germany itself.87 The ECtHR has 
found positive obligations to prevent violations of the ECHR when 
public authorities are aware or have knowledge of the continuing 
violations, even if the public authorities have taken steps to improve 
the situations.88 In this instance, members of the German Bundestag 
have publicly spoken out against the privacy violations in states to 
which Trovicor has exported its technologies.89 Moreover, European 
countries and the broader European Parliament have responded by 
creating stricter export controls for dual-use technologies, such as 
those exported by Trovicor, and urged member states of the EU to 
take corrective measures to prevent surveillance technologies from 
reaching authoritarian regimes.90 Thus, Germany had knowledge of 
both Trovicor’s activities in Syria and the severity of human rights 
violations occurring in Syria, putting Germany in a position to 
prevent the exportation of these dual-use goods in the first place. 
Furthermore, the nature and extent of the human rights abuses, in 
which Trovicor was complicit, speaks to the nature of the positive 
 
 87. See Knight, supra note 42 (illustrating the political climate and how 
minority parties in the Bundestag have called for increased pressure against 
companies like Trovicor); Valentina Pop, EU Companies Banned from Selling 
Spyware to Repressive Regimes, EU OBSERVER (Oct. 11, 2011, 6:12 PM), 
http://euobserver.com/cyber/113791 (describing the negative response from NGOs 
and the media to dual-use technology being exported to repressive regimes and 
explaining the European Parliament’s desire to be more pro-active in preventing 
this technology from being spread in the first place). 
 88. See, e.g., Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 55723/00, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 
257 ¶ 89 (2005) (deciding that Russia had a duty to prevent the environmental 
pollution of a steel plant because the pollution violated the right to a private life 
and the degraded quality of the environment was both long-standing and well 
known). 
 89. See Tom Burghardt, Torture Island: Where Offshore Meets the National 
Surveillance State, DISSIDENT VOICE (Sept. 5, 2011), http://dissidentvoice.org/ 
2011/09/torture-island-where-offshore-meets-the-national-surveillance-state/ 
(drawing attention to comments by a spokesman for the association of federal 
criminal investigators in Germany who commented on the corruption within 
Siemens, which allowed Trovicor’s technologies to be exported). 
 90. See Cindy Cohn, EU Parliament Takes the First Step to Prevent Sales of 
Surveillance Equipment Used to Violate Human Rights, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Oct. 6, 2011) (discussing the passage of an EU resolution in 2011 that bans the 
sale of surveillance technology that is then used to violate either human rights or 
democratic principles). 
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obligation established and the scope of German responsibility.91 While 
the ECtHR typically provides a margin of appreciation, similar to the 
judicial standard of reasonable deference, towards the decision-
making of national authorities, the severity of the intrusions on privacy 
and the extent of Trovicor’s involvement in these human rights abuses 
will greatly diminish the margin of appreciation afforded to 
Germany.92 When the cause of a human rights violation can easily be 
attributed to a specific corporation, the ECtHR has been willing to 
hold the state in which the corporation is based responsible because a 
positive obligation to prevent the violation exists.93 Thus, the ECtHR 
will likely find Germany responsible for Trovicor’s actions given that 
Germany had control over Trovicor, Germany knew of Trovicor’s 
history of exporting its technologies to authoritarian regimes for 
surveillance purposes, and Germany knew of Trovicor’s complicity in 
violating the Convention in such an egregious manner.  
2. Germany Is Responsible for the Violations of Information Privacy 
Because Germany Failed to Fulfill Its Responsibility to Prevent 
Trovicor from Committing Human Rights Abuses 
Given that state authorities have actual knowledge of Trovicor’s 
actions, the next step is to compare the margin of appreciation 
 
 91. See Timm, supra note 85 (shedding light on the capacity of Trovicor’s 
technologies to track and locate individuals which may be allowing the Syrian 
government to detain and torture its citizens as has reportedly occurred in Bahrain 
and Tunisia); Frankfurt am Main, Middle East: German Technology Used Against 
Democratic Movements, INT’L SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://www.ishr.org/Detailansicht.697+M5e490bfdd7b.0.html (summarizing the 
severity of the crackdowns on opposition movements like those in Syria that can 
be attributed to comprehensive surveillance packages like those provided to Syria 
by Trovicor). 
 92. See The Margin of Appreciation, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/ 
t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 
2013) (noting that, given the proportionality doctrine, the margin of appreciation is 
severely diminished given a high risk that a right codified in the European 
Convention is being violated). See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of 
Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
843, 843–47 (1999) (providing the historical development of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and explaining under which conditions the ECtHR will grant 
higher levels of deference). 
 93. See Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 55723/00, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 
94 (2005) (finding Russia responsible when the source of the environmental 
pollution in Cherepovets was easily attributable to the Russian steel plant). 
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afforded to states with the standard of effectiveness. The standard of 
effectiveness is the requisite degree of protection that needs to be 
afforded to remedy an ongoing human rights violation.94 After 
accounting for Germany’s margin of appreciation, the ECtHR 
typically looks to a fair balance between the societal interests at stake 
and the burden imposed on the state to ensure protection of ECHR 
rights.95  
First, the ECtHR will determine the standard of effectiveness, 
otherwise described as the mechanisms ultimately necessary to deter 
companies such as Trovicor from engaging in agreements to provide 
their technologies to repressive governments such as Syria.96 In this 
regard, ECtHR judges are afforded the benefit of hindsight.97 While 
German law provides the opportunity for the Bundestag to pass 
legislation requiring reporting of exports in order to affect political 
interests and the fulfillment of legal obligations, these laws have 
failed to implement clear criminal law provisions for committing 
human rights violations abroad.98 In this instance, the standard of 
 
 94. See DIMITRIS XENOS, THE POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE UNDER 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 118 (2012) (defining the standard 
of effectiveness as an attempt to achieve an end and a complete resolution to the 
human rights abuse). 
 95. See López-Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
¶¶ 51–58 (1994) (determining that despite the state’s margin of appreciation, 
specifically to promote a positive economic impact, the pollution and nuisance 
created by the waste-management plant negatively affected the community 
interests so much that a fair balance was not met between the competing interests); 
MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 19 (listing factors the Court has considered in 
determining the “fair balance,” including: “the importance of the public interest at 
stake and the state’s margin of appreciation, the rule of law and the practice of the 
state parties with regard to the question at issue . . . the importance of the right at 
issue, the requirement to protect the rights of third parties, etc.”). 
 96. See López-Ostra, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 46–47, 58 (finding that 
the municipality’s partial shutdown of the plant was not sufficient to cure the third 
party’s violation of Article 8 because the state was required to guarantee a 
complete end to the violations); XENOS, supra note 94, at 106 (identifying that the 
ECtHR looks to the minimum scope of protection by adding up the different 
measures necessary to prevent the violation of the rights). 
 97. XENOS, supra note 94, at 118 (noting that judges may review comparative 
examples of past actions by member states or resolutions to aid their 
determinations). 
 98. See Außenwirtschaftsgesetz [AWG] [Foreign Trade Act], May 27, 2009, 
BGBL. I at 1150, §26 (Ger.) (laying out the reporting requirements for dual-use 
exports and the potential civil liability arising therefrom); Export Control, FED. 
OFFICE OF ECON. & EXP. CONTROL, http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/export_control/ 
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effectiveness is relatively high since Germany’s control over 
Trovicor in this situation does not concern a direct extraterritorial 
action but a domestic action with extraterritorial effect.99 The ECtHR 
recognizes that in certain contexts criminal law provisions are 
necessary to prevent a third party from violating an individual’s right 
to a private life, despite the wide margin of appreciation afforded to 
the state.100 The ECtHR’s success depends on criminal laws’ ability 
to create an effective deterrent and prevent future violations of 
ECHR rights.101 Because Trovicor’s technology intrudes into 
individuals’ private lives and leads to detentions, tortures, and 
disappearances, its technology violates the dignity of individuals; 
thus, the ECtHR will likely find that by not using criminal law 
provisions or preventing Trovicor from exporting dual-use 
technologies, Germany failed both to create an effective deterrent 
and to bridge the governance gap.102  
Moreover, the ECtHR is likely to identify other effective methods 
Germany could have employed to curtail Trovicor from propping up 
the Assad regime, in order to demonstrate whether the margin of 
 
index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (recognizing the need to regulate export 
control technology through the Foreign Trade Act in order to prevent human rights 
violations). But see STEPHAN MÜLLER, OPPENHOFF & PARTNER, EXPORT 
CONTROL: GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ADOPTS AMENDMENT OF THE 
FOREIGN TRADE ACT (on file with publication) (commenting that the 2012 
amendments to the Foreign Trade Act downgraded many criminal offenses to 
simple regulatory offenses and imposed higher standards on what could constitute 
a criminal offense). 
 99. See AUGENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 43 (discussing that the ECtHR 
acknowledged a distinction between the two types of extraterritorial actions in 
Bankovic, and that the ECtHR holds domestic actions with an extraterritorial effect 
to a different standard). 
 100. See X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No/ 8978/80, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 24–27 
(1985), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57603 (finding that the civil law did not adequately protect a sexually-abused, 
mentally handicapped minor, nor did it afford her the right to enjoy a private life). 
 101. Id. But see Rainer Buergin, Germany Eases Rules for Dual-Use Exports, 
Ministry Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-08-15/germany-eases-rules-for-dual-use-goods-exports-ministry-says 
.html (showing that Germany makes the exportation of dual-use weapons a 
criminal offense because of the dangerous nature of the weapons and the need to 
deter the exportation of those arms through criminal embargoes). 
 102. But see Export Control, supra note 98 (indicating that Germany is moving 
in the opposite direction by relaxing restrictions so that only reckless infringement 
of embargoes on weapons can be criminalized). 
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appreciation is wide enough to cover Germany’s actions.103 The 
ECtHR looks to the standard of effectiveness, evaluating both the 
potential risk to individuals and determining available practical 
measures.104 The potential risk is broad because a large number of 
people in foreign countries could be put under surveillance by their 
government’s use of German technology.105 Moreover, the 
sophistication of surveillance technologies, which include deep 
packet inspection technologies that are extremely intrusive, 
magnifies risk thereby providing the highest harm to individual 
dignity.106 Because the potential risk to individuals is so broad, any 
practical solution needs to start at the source of the problem.107 While 
states are afforded a wide margin of appreciation in respect to Article 
8, the ECtHR likely will find that Germany could have taken 
reasonably necessary measures to protect an individual’s right to 
privacy.108 
 
 103. See discussion infra Part IV.A (conveying that a know-your-customer 
standard is a relatively effective method that Germany could have adopted). 
 104. See XENOS, supra note 94, at 109–10 (using the decision in Oneryildiz v. 
Turkey, an Article 2 case, to show that the ECtHR first utilized the standard of 
effectiveness doctrine to determine whether a state failed to fulfill its positive 
obligation). 
 105. See Herman Zschiegner, The Surveillance Market and Its Victims, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/data-
visualization/wired-for-repression/ (providing a visual representation that shows 
that the citizens of Syria, Iran, Bahrain, and Tunisia have already been put at risk 
by Germany’s technology, which is produced by multiple German surveillance 
firms); see also Jennifer Barker, EU Parliament Urges Tough Rules for 
Surveillance Tech Exporters, TECHWORLD (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/440003/eu_parliament_urges_tough_rules_ 
surveillance_tech_exporters/ (noting that other repressive states seek sophisticated 
European surveillance technologies to spy on their citizens, including states like 
Iran, Ethiopia, Sudan, China, Burma, and Cuba). 
 106. See Fuchs, supra note 47, at 31–32 (documenting the impact of Trovicor’s 
deep packet inspection which can record data related to any target, including his or 
her location, and communications like instant messages and phone conversations). 
 107. See MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 186–87 (acknowledging that positive 
obligations often require procedural policy changes by a state in order to 
effectively remedy the violation); XENOS, supra note 94, at 116–18 (detailing 
practical protection mechanisms found by the ECtHR and explaining that these 
protections must meet a standard of effectiveness to remedy the current violation 
and future violations). 
 108. See López-Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
¶ 55 (1994) (recognizing that positive obligations diminish the margin of 
appreciation and require states to take reasonably necessary measures to secure 
those obligations); JEAN-FRANCOIS AKANDJI-KOMBE, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
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The fair balance test sheds light on whether the state correctly 
assessed its need to take action given the standard of effectiveness 
and whether a state is obliged to secure an ECHR-protected right 
through a positive obligation.109 The interests for Germany in 
allowing Trovicor to continue its exportation of surveillance 
technology without extra restrictions include avoiding the costs to 
secure monitoring of exports and promoting economic growth from 
those exports.110 The public costs to monitor exports and to 
effectively administer stricter export laws are very expensive, 
procedural endeavors.111 Generally, the ECtHR has not shown 
reluctance in requiring states to institute procedural safeguards, such 
as information gathering, to guarantee that ECHR rights are not 
violated.112  
 
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (2007), 
available at http://echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/1B521F61-A636-43F5-AD56-
5F26D46A4F55/0/DG2ENHRHAND072007.pdf (explaining that clear limits exist 
to a state’s margin of appreciation in the context of Article 8 rights); Guerra v. 
Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 210 ¶¶ 59–60 (1998) (indicating 
that if a state were to provide information to the population about the threat to their 
dignity, then the ECtHR would recognize that the state attempted to mitigate the 
harm). 
 109. See MOWBRAY, supra note 32, at 186–87 (summarizing that the ECtHR has 
refused to find positive obligations for social facilities and welfare benefits); see 
also Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 46, Annex 11 
(noting that one of the biggest challenges posed by the governance gap is the need 
for states to effectively balance the social benefits of business growth with the 
need for human rights protection). 
 110. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, SURVEILLANCE OF INTRA-EURO-AREA 
COMPETITIVENESS AND IMBALANCES 56 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-1_en.pdf 
(indicating that much of German economic growth derives from external exports 
and the ability to stay competitive despite the increasing supply of cheap goods 
from Asia); U.N. DEV. PROGRAM SOUTH EASTERN & EASTERN EUR. 
CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE CONTROL OF SMALL ARMS & LIGHT WEAPONS, 
INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES 18–19 (2011), available at 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/research/armaments/
transfers/publications/other_publ/other%20publications/Internal%20Compliance%
20Programmes.pdf (reciting the administrative monitoring required by Germany to 
implement the Foreign Trade Law, with regards to export licensing, certification, 
and other mandatory compliance measures). 
 111. See Buergin, supra note 101 (reporting German intentions to relax 
restrictions on dual-use exports in order to promote German competitiveness 
abroad). 
 112. See XENOS, supra note 94, at 115–16 (discussing that the ECtHR often 
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Lax export control laws directly increase Germany’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by adding positive value to its balance of 
payments;113 however, the economic benefit in question only relates 
to export of dual-use surveillance technologies, which shows a 
marginal value of lax controls of these particular exports.114 The 
other major source of economic gain is encouraging growth and 
innovation in dual-use goods sectors by broadening the consumer 
market to foreign states, thereby increasing demand.115 While the 
surveillance sector in Germany produces high returns, the market is 
already flooded with fifteen larger companies, indicating that there 
might not be much opportunity for small and medium-size 
surveillance firms to grow.116 
The societal interests at stake, however, are much greater than the 
marginal economic benefits that Germany could derive from laxer 
dual-use export laws.117 This is true because when weighing these 
competing interests, the ECtHR has typically not allowed purely 
economic concerns to justify the intrusion into ECHR protected 
rights.118 Even if the ECtHR imposes a heavy financial burden on the 
 
requires administrative safeguards to be implemented at both a general and a 
specific level). 
 113. See generally Paul Krugman, European Crisis Realities, N.Y. TIMES 
KRUGMAN OPINION PAGES BLOG (Feb. 25, 2012, 7:01 AM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/european-crisis-realities/ (showing 
the integral role that exports played in the development of German competitiveness 
and the increase in GDP despite the growing European economic crisis). 
 114. See IAN DAVIS, THE REGULATION OF ARMS AND DUAL-USE EXPORTS: 
GERMANY, SWEDEN, AND THE UK 19–22 (2002) (pointing out that export controls 
on surveillance, which is a subset of regulations on military trade, is merely one 
tool used in the vast arsenal of trade restrictions and regulations). 
 115. See id. at 161–62, 262 (highlighting that Germany has innovative tracking 
systems, and that increases in overall sales of dual-use exports translates to higher 
employment by companies in the exporting state). 
 116. See Jean Marc Manach, Spyfiles: Revelations of a Billion-Dollar Mass 
Surveillance Industry, OWNI.EU (Dec. 1, 2011), http://owni.eu/2011/12/01/spyfiles-
wikileaks-revelations-of-mass-internet-surveillance/ (portraying the saturation of 
the surveillance export market with over 133 companies exporting such 
technologies, fifteen of which were located in Germany). 
 117. See Fuchs, supra note 47, at 32 (detailing the intrusiveness of Trovicor’s 
technologies and the repression that causes violations to individuals’ dignity). 
 118. See López-Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
¶ 55 (1994) (finding the detriment to the enjoyment of private life caused by 
pollution from a waste treatment plant to outweigh the economic gain that the state 
received from the functioning of the plant); XENOS, supra note 94, at 103 (arguing 
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state, it tends to give preference to severe deprivation of rights over 
economic gains.119 Similar to cases already heard by the ECtHR, the 
Syrian Electronic Army consistently violates Article 8 rights—the 
rights to a private life and correspondence—through the collection of 
private information, the interception of correspondence, and the 
storage of private information.120 Due to the immediacy and 
seriousness of the violations, which include the unlawful interference 
with private lives and more serious violations directly resulting from 
Trovicor’s technologies, the ECtHR will likely determine that the 
societal interests at stake are quite grave.121 
Moreover, much harm is done to the European community when 
entities discredit ECHR rights, because this creates a perception that 
rights can be violated without adequate justification, thereby 
increasing the chances of rights violations in the future.122 
 
that the pressing social need of extreme rights violations outweighs the potential 
economic benefits that a state stands to gain). 
 119. See Ledyaeva v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 9-10 (2006) (holding that the 
economic benefit of the steel plant was not sufficient to justify a nearly complete 
deprivation to the right to enjoy private life); Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 
55723/00, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 257 ¶ 101 (2005) (finding a violation of Article 8, 
despite recognizing that economic benefit of the steel plant to the Vologda area is 
explicitly considered a legitimate basis under Article 8(2) of the ECHR); XENOS, 
supra note 94, at 103 (comparing social costs to economic benefits). 
 120. See Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 62–63 (2000) 
(holding that the collection and storage of private information was grounds for a 
violation under Article 8); Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 80 (1984) (“[A]s far as interception of communications is 
concerned, the interferences with the applicant’s right under Article 8 (art. 8) to 
respect for his private life and correspondence . . . were not ‘in accordance with the 
law.’”). 
 121. See Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 3124 ¶¶ 113–16 (1998) (explaining that seriousness and immediacy of the 
rights violations directly affects the outcome of the fair balance test); Anita 
McNaught, The Business of Detention in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/20128184129588523.html 
(providing evidence of how surveillance strategies have been directly linked to 
detention and torture in the city of al-Bab, Syria); cf. BEN WAGNER, EXPORTING 
CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 9, 10, 12, 15 (2012) (documenting 
the human rights violations in Tunisia created by the use of similar surveillance 
technologies, such as violations of the freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press, as well as disappearances that occurred in Egypt). 
 122. See Sarah Miller, Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial 
Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the European Convention, 20 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1223, 1224–26 (2009) (illustrating the reputational harm for the 
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Unfortunately, Germany has failed to take the necessary measures to 
end Trovicor’s violations of human rights.123 Accordingly, the 
ECtHR will likely determine that Germany is not afforded a wide 
margin of appreciation in this instance and that the fair balance test 
indicates Germany violated the ECHR by failing to take action to 
place necessary regulations on dual-export surveillance technologies. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to having the European Court of Human Rights decide 
a case related to the human rights violations facilitated by Trovicor, 
other actions could be taken to prevent future commission of such 
human rights abuses. These solutions would require much 
international cooperation, but should be implemented as soon as 
possible to increase protection and prevent other rights violations 
from occurring in the interim. Broader approaches include 
strengthening the Global Network Initiative (GNI) or implementing 
stronger human rights protections through the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), while a narrower approach might require 
individual states, such as Germany, to change their export laws.  
A. THE GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE MODEL SHOULD BE 
ADOPTED WITH MORE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 
A coalition of ICT-related companies started the GNI to protect 
Internet freedom and prevent violations of privacy through the 
voluntary commitment of individual companies.124 The GNI has not 
 
legitimacy of human rights and of the ECHR when perceived rights violations, 
even if they are in a foreign territory, go unaddressed). 
 123. See Moritz Jaeger, Germany Proposes Ban on Surveillance Software 
Exports to Totalitarian Regimes, ZDNET (Sept. 18, 2012, 3:05 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/germany-proposes-ban-on-surveillance-software-exports-to-
totalitarian-regimes-7000004379/ (reporting that Germany has called for the EU to 
reform its dual-use export policies instead of taking action on a domestic level); 
David Meyer, EU Moves to Stop Surveillance Tech Sales to Despots, ZDNET (Dec. 
8, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/eu-moves-to-stop-surveillance-tech-
sales-to-despots-3040094614/ (indicating that the EU has recognized the leakage 
of surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes and has called for all parties 
involved to take responsibility for this phenomenon). 
 124. See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE NETH., GLOBAL CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/minbuza/en/the_ministry/global-
corporate-responsibility---freedom-online.pdf (stating that companies like Google, 
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been effective, however, because even though major information and 
communication technology firms have signed onto the voluntary 
agreement that promotes corporate social responsibility, many other 
businesses have refused to become members.125 Furthermore, even 
corporations that have signed onto the agreement have failed to 
create a meaningful change in their decision-making by taking active 
measures to prevent their technology from falling into the hands of 
repressive governments.126 
Instead, states should implement the GNI’s model with more 
effective enforcement, to actually change the behavior of companies 
and remedy the concerns of a governance gap.127 The Council of 
Europe and the EU have already made efforts to address these 
corporate abuses by recognizing that it is in the best interest of 
Europe to place universal human rights above these corporate 
interests.128 The United Nations (UN) has already stated that 
businesses should be held to a higher standard of corporate social 
responsibility to guarantee that fundamental rights are not violated.129 
 
Microsoft, Yahoo!, Evoca, and Folksam started GNI in order to protect free 
expression and privacy). 
 125. See Verne G. Kopytoff, Sites Like Twitter Absent From Free Speech Pact, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/technology/ 
07rights.html?_r=0 (reporting that three years after the launch of GNI, many 
important players have still refused to sign onto the voluntary pact). 
 126. See Jillian C. York, Government Internet Surveillance Starts With  
Eyes Built in the West, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 2, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/09/government-internet-surveillance-starts-
eyes-built (noting Hillary Clinton’s support of the GNI because it establishes a 
responsibility mechanism for corporations). 
 127. See Eva Galperin & Rebecca Bowe, Global Network Initiative Gets an 
Inside Look at Tech Firms’ Human Rights Practices, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(May 11, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/05/global-network-initiative-
gets-inside-look-tech-firms%E2%80%99-human-rights-practices (recording the 
benefits of the GNI, such as, establishing senior oversight, communicating human 
rights issues throughout the organization, and establishing formal mechanisms to 
review metrics). 
 128. See ECCJ & AI, supra note 16, at 4 (noting that, since 2007, the Council of 
Europe passed a resolution on corporate social responsibility and that the EU has 
stressed the need for greater accountability on the part of corporations). 
 129. See U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED 
NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK, U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/11/04, at 14 (2011) (highlighting the special role businesses play in 
society, and the importance of businesses committing to respect human rights). 
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While the UN’s groundwork is helpful to further the cause, a 
binding, international mechanism that punishes companies for failing 
to meet the standards outlined is needed in order to effect change in a 
timely manner. 
B. GERMANY SHOULD ADOPT MORE STRINGENT DUAL-USE 
EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS 
Given that the GNI has failed to alter the behavior of corporations, 
binding state laws are needed to materially affect the actions of 
companies and to account for the governance gap, an option of which 
has already been discussed before the German Parliament.130 In this 
vein, a German policy that would force companies to affirmatively 
determine for what purposes and how their customers intend to use 
their products could be effective at preventing another Trovicor-
esque incident from occurring.131 Such a proposal could include more 
stringent export control laws that specifically outlaw the sale of 
surveillance technologies to Syria, to oppressive regimes generally, 
or to states with overbroad police discretion.132 This approach is 
necessary when voluntary approaches by companies to effectively 
monitor the activities of their clientele fail.133 Under such a system, 
 
 130. See Dixie Hawtin, Internet Charters and Principles: Trends and Insights, 
GLOBAL PARTNERS & ASSOCS., http://www.giswatch.org/sites/default/files/gisw_-
_internet_charters_and_principles.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (underscoring the 
ineffectiveness of the Global Network Initiative because this charter is simply a 
voluntary engagement by companies and fails to have any sort of implementation 
mechanism); Knight, supra note 42 (elaborating on the pressure put on by the 
German socialist Left Party and the Green Party, both of whom demanded real 
accountability by these corporations through the creation of stricter laws to 
regulate the activities and exports of companies like Trovicor). 
 131. See Cohn & York, supra note 73 (conveying how a know-your-customer 
standard similar to the requirements laid out in the United States’ Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act could lay the foundation for effective regulation of dual-use exports). 
But see Sari Horwitz & Shyamantha Asokan, U.S. Probing Use of Surveillance 
Technology in Syria, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/world/national-security/us-probes-use-of-surveillance-technology-in-syria/ 
2011/11/17/gIQAS1iEVN_story.html (indicating that technology from California-
based Blue Coat Systems might have entered Syria, thereby showing that the 
know-your-customer standard of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act might not be 
sufficient to curb the behavior of these companies). 
 132. Cf. 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. 3 2013) (describing the administrative red flag 
system in the United States that helps prevent exports from getting into the wrong 
hands). 
 133. See Cohn & York, supra note 73 (documenting the need for regulatory 
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the human rights record of a country and other country-specific 
factors can serve as red flags for any company seeking to export 
surveillance or other dual-use technologies.134  
More extreme examples of German regulation could include a 
complete ban on exportation of surveillance technologies to any 
authoritarian state as a proactive means to help eliminate the risk of 
aiding human rights abuses.135 Any approach focused on German 
legislation would efficiently remedy the problem without having to 
deal with concerns about applying the European Convention 
extraterritorially.136 While this comment does not provide an 
exhaustive list of legislative options available to Germany, the key 
takeaway is that Germany should develop more stringent export 
controls that create harsher punishments on companies that facilitate 
human rights abuses because Germany should seek to avoid ECHR 
liability for failing to effectively regulate its exports.  
C. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SHOULD ESTABLISH A 
HUMAN RIGHTS−BASED EXCEPTION TO FREE TRADE TO 
ENCOURAGE STRICTER EXPORT CONTROLS BY MEMBER STATES 
As an organization with a larger number of member states than the 
Council of Europe, the WTO is in a prime position to prevent future 
rights violations that could be controlled through international 
trade.137 Currently, the WTO allows states to limit trade if the traded 
item could hinder the right to life, a principle found in Article 2 of 
the ECHR.138 The WTO does not create trade exceptions for many 
 
approaches given that Nokia Siemens Networks, which owned Trovicor prior to 
Perusa Partners Fund, had adopted a voluntary Human Rights Policy, but clearly 
failed to abide by the mandates of that policy when it decided to export these 
technologies). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Knight, supra note 42 (focusing on the potential of an EU-wide ban on 
exporting dual-use technologies to any of these authoritarian states because of the 
tendency of these states to use these technologies for illegitimate purposes). 
 136. See Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 ¶ 61 (2001). 
 137. See Members and Observers, WTO http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (indicating that the WTO 
currently has 158 members). 
 138. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (1995) (listing the right to life exception to free trade); ECHR, 
supra note 11, art. 2 (codifying a right to life in the ECHR). 
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other kinds of rights violations, however, including the ECHR’s 
Article 8 right to a private life.139  
By expanding the GATT exceptions, the WTO could help a 
responsible state create stricter dual-use export controls, such as a 
“know-your-customer standard,” to avoid expensive litigation costs 
from states that typically import these dual-use technologies.140 More 
importantly, modifying the GATT exceptions would create a new 
cause of action for people whose rights have been violated to file a 
formal complaint in front of the WTO, or even in the exporting 
states’ domestic court for failure to adhere to an international 
treaty.141 These benefits could greatly enhance the reach of 
extraterritorial human rights claims and create a positive incentive 
for states to adopt stricter export controls.142 Thus, expanding the 
GATT exceptions to include human rights not only would create an 
international framework for human rights protection in trade, but 
would also encourage states to adopt stricter trade standards to avoid 
liability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The increased export of Western surveillance technologies to 
oppressive regimes, such as Assad’s regime in Syria, demonstrates 
the need for stronger restrictions to prevent future violations of 
universally recognized rights.143 Because of the multinational nature 
 
 139. See Gudrun Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages 
and Suggesting Convergence, 2 IDLO VOICES OF DEV. JURISTS PAPER SERIES 3, 
12–14 (2005) (defending the implementation of human rights and social clauses in 
the GATT exceptions to free trade in order to create a clear and non-arbitrary basis 
for imposing sanctions). 
 140. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT/WTO 
LEGAL SYSTEM 61 (Joel P. Trachtman ed., 1987) (identifying fear of lawsuits as a 
legitimate concern for developed states and attributing the rise of pragmatism as an 
attempt by these developed states to avoid WTO lawsuits lodged by developing 
states). 
 141. See Zagel, supra note 139, at 12–13 (indicating that a human rights 
exception to the GATT would increase the overall protection of human rights by 
placing the burden on complainant states to show the trade restriction is not 
necessary to achieve the goal of increased human rights protections). 
 142. See id. at 22 (recognizing that an amendment to GATT is necessary to 
reach broad human rights protection, but that such protection is unlikely to occur in 
the current political climate). 
 143. See Timm, supra note 85 (recognizing the threat posed to internet freedoms 
by the increased use of surveillance technologies by repressive regimes and the 
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of these companies, it is difficult to hold each company responsible; 
however the ECtHR offers a framework for positive obligations that 
requires states to prevent human rights abuses by a corporation 
before they occur. Trovicor’s actions fall within Article 1’s 
jurisdiction because of the law enforcement nature of Trovicor’s 
surveillance technology and the justifications given by Assad for 
using such technology as a means to fight terrorists and promote 
national security.144 Moreover, Germany’s failure to regulate 
Trovicor’s actions constitutes a failure to fulfill the positive 
obligation imposed on it under the ECHR.145 The result of such 
violations is extremely important, not only because of the arbitrary 
detentions, torture, and disappearances that result from the invasions 
on Syrian privacy, but also because the intrusions help break down 
the opposition and prolong the internecine conflict. 
 
integral part Western technology plays in propping up these complex Syrian 
surveillance systems). 
 144. See supra Part III.A (exploring the relationship between the concept of 
preservation of public order and the development of the extraterritoriality principle 
of ECHR jurisdiction). 
 145. See supra Part III.B (discussing the duty Germany owes to Syrians whose 
right to private life is being violated and Germany’s failure to impose reasonable 
restrictions on Trovicor). 
